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If you build it will they come? The boom in purpose-built student 
accommodation in central Liverpool: destudentification, studentification and 
the future of the city 
 
Abstract. The wave of UK higher education expansion and the commodification of the student 
experience have reshaped many towns and cities not least in the development of large 
swathes of private purpose-built student accommodation (PBSA). A growing body of research 
has explored the role of PBSA in the processes of studentification and destudentification of 
neighbourhoods. This study explores the huge and rapid development of PBSA in Liverpool 
and, for the first time, raises questions not just about its impacts but about its sustainability. 
The model upon which many of Liverpool’s PBSA projects are based generates hidden risks 
and carries a momentum that neglects wider market conditions. We conclude that there will 
be a disorderly end to Liverpool’s PBSA boom and consider the likely implications for a range 
of stakeholders. 
 
Introduction 
There is an emergent literature on student accommodation that has come on stream 
in the last fifteen or so years. This work has addressed the impact of changing student 
populations on cities in a systematic way for the first time (Munro et al, 2009). Such 
scholarship is important because it is increasingly apparent that students are altering 
the physical and social fabric of cities in new ways (Chatterton, 2010). 
There are several strands to this research. Initially, interest centered on what Smith 
(2002; 2005) termed ‘studentification’: the concentration of student residents in 
particular urban locales. Munro et al (2009) demonstrated that students had become 
a significant and segregated presence in British cities and noted the disruptive impact 
of student enclaves on settled populations in local neighbourhoods. The problems 
students collectively impose on their neighbours include noise nuisances; worries over 
rising crime (as students are, for example, more vulnerable to burglary); aggravations 
associated with parking; poorly-managed refuse disposal; the summer disruption of 
multiple moving and student housing refurbishment; and the perception of 
overdeveloped localities as houses are extended upwards and outwards to the extent 
that the privacy of neighbours is compromised and they feel ‘hemmed in’ (Allinson, 
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2006; Hubbard, 2008; Kenyon,1997; Macintyre, 2003; Sage et al, 2012a; Sage et al, 
2012b). Most often characterized in the literature as a generator of multiple negative 
externalities, studentification has also been more broadly interpreted as a form of 
gentrification that marginalizes and excludes non-student groups therefore 
undermining policy preferences for the development of ‘balanced communities’ 
(Chatterton, 1999; Smith, 2008; Smith and Holt, 2007). 
Although discussions of studentification mostly adopt a pejorative tone some 
researchers have noted that the process also has positive aspects. For example, 
resilient student spending can provide a fillip to local demand and underpin the 
provision of cultural infrastructure (Hubbard, 2008; Kenyon, 1997).  The possibility that 
studentification has a more nuanced impact on local neighbourhoods raises questions 
about its potential role in progressive urban policy (Ruiu, 2017; Smith, 2008). This also 
applies in the case of destudentification, where student populations decant from 
localities raising important questions for housing markets in particular areas (Kinton et 
al, 2016). 
A final strand of literature considers the development of substantial swathes of 
purpose-built student accommodation (PBSA) in urban centres. Given the scale of 
investment in many British cities, PBSA has become an asset class in its own right 
(Barnes and Tostevin, 2014; Hale, 2018; Smith and Hubbard, 2014), though there 
have been some general concerns about the sustainablility of the market (Wilmot, 
2013; Curry 2017). PBSA has potentially profound implications for the economic, 
social and cultural futures of towns and cities and raises issues of social segregation 
and the search for a recipe for balanced communities in a new context (Hubbard, 2009; 
Sage et al, 2013; Smith and Hubbard, 2014). 
The present paper is an attempt to contribute to this literature through an exploration 
of the issues thrown up by the extraordinary growth of PBSA in central Liverpool, much 
of which has been engineered by speculative and sometimes innovative forms of 
private investment. Over a short space of time Liverpool has experienced 
destudentification of some of its traditional areas of student settlement and the rapid 
PBSA-based studentification of the city centre. We consider some of the impacts of 
this shift. An urgent question, which we raise for the first time, concerns the 
sustainability of the avalanche of PBSA investment in Liverpool. Our research 
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suggests that the volume of PBSA coming on stream in Liverpool over the next few 
years amounts to a clear excess supply. This would be the case even if the local 
student population stabilized around its current levels. Worryingly, however, should 
the English university ‘boom’ begin to falter – and we think there are reasonable 
grounds to assume that it cannot continue into the medium term – a sharp check to 
demand for student accommodation in Liverpool raises some worrying questions 
about the city’s economy and its physical, social and cultural health. Our work is based 
on semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders in this market: university 
accommodation professionals, PBSA investors and developers, local property market 
professionals, university administrators, local politicians and activists. We have also 
used a range of documentary evidence and compiled data from publicly-available 
sources. 
On a memorable visit to the London School of Economics after the financial crisis, the 
Queen asked of academics why did none of you see this coming? We do not compare 
the unwinding of a speculative bubble in one city to that global catastrophe but this is 
something we think is coming. 
The paper is organized into the following sections. We begin with a discussion of the 
polity and economy of Liverpool as a context for our work. This is followed by a brief 
overview of recent developments in English higher education which have in part fueled 
the boom in PBSA. We then turn to explore and explain the continuing waves of 
studentification and destudentification that have washed over Liverpool in recent years. 
In conclusion we argue that Liverpool’s PBSA boom is likely to come to a disorderly 
end and we consider policy measures that may be taken to soften the landing. 
 
Liverpool: policy and progress 
The long-term decline and more recent recovery of Liverpool has been extensively 
documented. The evaporation of port-related activity as a source of employment in the 
decades after the Second World War left the city struggling to find a place in the Fordist 
international division of labour (Cocks, 2016; Lane, 1987; Meegan et al, 2014). Dock 
work was sacrificed on the twin alters of EU membership – which made Liverpool’s 
Atlantic orientation problematic – and containerization (North, 2017). Regional policy 
provided what proved to be a short-term solution. Manufacturing plants of major 
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multinationals were attracted to Merseyside in the 1960s and were an important 
source of jobs. But the end of the postwar boom, the crisis of Fordism, and the deep 
economic and social abrasions of monetarism swiftly wrecked this model of 
development; manufacturing employment in Liverpool and the wider region sharply 
contracted and the city endured an ordeal of extended economic and political upheaval 
(Glyn and Harrison, 1980; Parkinson, 1985). The resources necessary to underpin a 
new local economic recovery were made available from the mid-1990s after 
Merseyside’s designation as an EU Objective 1 area significantly lagging behind other 
regions in terms of income and unemployment (Evans, 2002). 
There is a general consensus that the initiatives and strategies arising from Objective 
1 funding greatly improved the economic prospects of the region (Anderton, 2017; 
Meegan, 2003; North, 2017; Nurse and Fulton, 2017). Objective 1 directly supported 
several flagship projects including transformational improvements to the waterfront, 
airport and rail infrastructure but more importantly – alongside Liverpool’s successful 
bid to be the European Capital of Culture in 2008 – it helped to positively condition 
private sector perceptions of Merseyside (Garcia et al, 2010). Tangible results include 
a £1bn remaking of central Liverpool as ‘Liverpool One’ by the Grosvenor Group. 
Opened in 2008, this huge investment in retailing, leisure activities and pedestrian 
connectivity has itself spawned substantial new residential and other developments 
around its fringe (Nurse, 2017).  A second privately-led initiative is the Peel Group’s 
‘Atlantic Gateway’, a £14bn project which has its western hinge on the lower Mersey 
(Atlantic Gateway, 2012; Harrison, 2014). The economic progress of Merseyside has 
been so notable that Objective 1 status is no longer justified given that local GDP 
levels have closed on the EU average. In the EU’s terminology, the locality needs to 
now think about strategies to consolidate growth rather than engender recovery (Nurse 
and Fulton, 2017). For North (2017, 212), this has at last left Liverpool looking like a 
‘normal’ city.  It should be noted however that Merseyside’s recent renaissance does 
not necessarily embrace every section of the local population (Boland, 2010; North, 
2017; Dembski et al, 2017); nor is the policy framework that helped to produce it 
unproblematic (Boland, 2007). 
The contemporary outlook for Liverpool and the wider region must be set against a set 
of new interrelated developments and challenges. These include the continuing 
uncertainties surrounding Brexit, the ramifications of the austerity strategy 
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implemented by UK governments since 2010, and the less-than-stable policy and 
institutional landscape of local economic development. Liverpool has levered its way 
to normalization with the help of EU resources. Were it not for Brexit these would be 
still accessible in the future, albeit at a reduced level given the city’s improved 
economic position. So an open question is whether UK government resources might 
compensate for what will be lost from Europe (Nurse and Fulton, 2017). On the other 
hand, Objective 1 has left the locality with a legacy of collective knowledge, experience 
and institutional forms allowing it to maturely respond to austerity (North, 2017). 
Unfortunately, the local policy and institutional framework has itself been serially and 
disruptively re-engineered by central government (Anderton, 2017). In 2010 Regional 
Development Agencies gave way to a kaleidoscope of Local Enterprise Partnerships 
(LEPs) that are considered in relative and absolute terms inadequately resourced 
(Harrison, 2012; Rees and Lord, 2013). More recently LEPs have in places like 
Merseyside been complemented by the designation of City Regions with directly 
elected executive mayors to run them. An early question for these institutions concerns 
the balance between their devolved responsibilities and ambitions on the one hand 
and the resources they are granted on the other. They may become vehicles – and 
scapegoats – for austerity imposed from central government but refracted locally 
(Nurse, 2015). 
It seems that the institutional contours of state-sponsored local economic development 
have been in recent years both noisy and increasingly resource constrained. Two final 
contextual issues for this paper result. First, entrepreneurial cities able to articulate 
their selling points in international competition may be best positioned to offset the 
pressures of austerity (Nurse and Fulton, 2017; Parkinson et al, 2016). Second, future 
economic development strategies that are ‘place based’ may be increasingly 
resourced and implemented by private actors in the manner of the noted Grosvenor 
and Peel Group examples (Harrison, 2014). 
Against this background the seemingly inexorable expansion of PBSA raises some 
initial questions. Is such investment in the infrastructure of higher education simply to 
be welcomed? It endorses the view of Liverpool as an attractive post-industrial city, it 
chimes with local development aspirations to build a knowledge economy (Parkinson 
et al, 2016), and it offers a notable stream of private-sector activity that the city needs 
as it grapples with nearly a decade of austerity (Harrison, 2014; Meegan et al, 2014). 
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However, if this property boom comes to a disorderly end as, historically, they tend to 
do (Akerlof and Schiller, 2009), what dangers lurk in physical decay, public liabilities 
and reputational damage for a rejuvenated city? 
 
The boom in English higher education: an exception to austerity 
In 1997 when the then newly-elected prime minister, Tony Blair, had the opportunity 
to make good on his electoral commitment to invest in British education as a means 
to fuel long-term economic growth there were a little over one million students in full-
time higher education (ONS, 2016). Since then student numbers have almost doubled 
with a high of 1.9 million in 2011/12. In 2016, a record 32.5 per cent of school leavers 
entered higher education in England (UCAS, 2016). 
The rapid expansion of universities was funded primarily by fee-paying students. 
Traditionally, university education in the UK had been provided at zero-user prices. 
First introduced by a Labour government in 1998 at £1,000 per year, annual fees for 
undergraduate programmes in England are presently capped at £9,250. There are few 
signs of a functioning competitive market in university education with all universities 
charging up to the cap. The differential fees anticipated in the literature – see, for 
example, Chatterton (2010) – have yet to appear and the market functions as an 
informal cartel. The overwhelming dependence of English universities on fee income 
is demonstrated in Figure 1. Fees outweigh all other income categories put together. 
 
Source: HESA 
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000
Tuition fees and education contracts
Funding body grants
Research grants and contracts
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Investment income
Donations and endowments
Figure 1. Income of English HE providers by source 
2014/15 and 2015/16 (£m)
2014/15
2015/16
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The politically and socially contentious issue of fees is particularly noteworthy when 
thinking about the explosion in student numbers as it was this new income stream that 
effectively insulated universities from austerity. The 2010 Spending Review (see HM 
Treasury, 2010) announced average government departmental cuts of 19 per cent but 
argued that, for universities, new fee income would offset reductions in the direct 
teaching grant income received from the state. Research suggests fees have actually 
more than compensated universities for the loss of teaching grant income, leaving 
them better resourced than before (Chowdry et al, 2012). The Spending Review also 
announced a new system of ‘graduate contributions’ – student loans – to ‘ensure that 
students will only pay once they have graduated and can afford to do so’ (p.53). Most 
of the direct costs of higher education to students were to be deferred into the future: 
an incentive to prospective students to attend university. 
The remarkable expansion of UK universities raised the question of how the much 
bigger numbers of students were to be residentially accommodated. Not all the extra 
students needed a place to live while at university: a post financial crisis slow-growing 
economy and the entry of more students from poorer backgrounds have probably been 
responsible for the increase in the proportion of students choosing to attend a local 
university and live in the family home (for a Liverpool-focused discussion see 
Holdsworth, 2008). In 2016 about a fifth of undergraduates lived at home compared to 
13 per cent in 2008 (Sodexo, 2016). Nevertheless, universities and the cities in which 
they are located have had to come to terms with demand for thousands, or tens of 
thousands extra beds in a relatively short space of time. 
 
The changing geography of student living in Liverpool 
Liverpool’s four universities (Liverpool; Liverpool John Moores; Liverpool Hope; and 
the Liverpool Institute of Performing Arts (LIPA)) collectively host around 50,000 
students. The two oldest and largest universities – Liverpool and Liverpool John 
Moores – have around 21,000 students each. Liverpool Hope has 6,000 students and 
LIPA less than a thousand. As of 2016, Liverpool’s total population was estimated at 
just under 500,000. Students are a major feature of the city and the universities are 
major generators of local jobs and incomes. 
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Historically, Liverpool’s student population was concentrated in three particular 
districts to the south of the city centre: 
 L7 (Picton and Kensington and Fairfield);  L15 (Wavertree);  L17 (Greenbank and St Michaels). 
In 2000, 66 per cent of students lived in these areas and were housed primarily in 
homes in multiple occupation (HMOs), or halls owned by Liverpool University 
(Liverpool Mayoral Review, 2015). In the last fifteen or so years there have been some 
spectacular changes in patterns of student settlement. The most startling of these is 
the continuing development of PBSA in the centre of Liverpool where, from an almost 
standing start, there are presently approaching 20,000 private PBSA beds available 
for rent. Major thoroughfares in the city are in the process of complete transformation 
with, for example, Lime Street hosting two developments that will alone provide an 
additional 1,500 beds. The plan for this site involved the fiercely-contested demolition 
of a pre-first world war cinema frontage and neighbouring buildings also of 
architectural interest (SAVE Britain’s Heritage, 2016).  Such has been the influx of 
students that the city council’s Central ward saw its population grow by 81 per cent 
between 2005 and 2015 (Liverpool City Council, 2017a). Over the same period, the 
city’s population grew by about 7 per cent. Part of the rationale for the creation of this 
ward in the early 2000s was the surge in its student population (authors’ interview; 
Boundary Committee for England, 2003). The new student population in central 
Liverpool has also been the focus of political attention with the city’s mayor launching 
a review into The future of student accommodation in Liverpool in 2015. 
At the same time as the centre of Liverpool has experienced studentification some – 
as yet more muted – reciprocal changes have occurred in the city’s traditional student 
districts. Commensurate with some modest growth in student numbers in Liverpool, 
demand for HMO accommodation has remained relatively stable in L7 and L15, 
though there is some evidence of oversupply, especially for median-rent properties 
(authors’ interview). It is also apparent that HMO providers in these areas are 
somewhat nervous of the implications of the student migration to the centre for the 
future of the market in which they compete (Liverpool Mayoral Review, 2015, appendix 
1, representation 12). Ward population estimates for 2016 indicate that these districts 
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continue to host roughly double the proportion of 16-39 year-olds than do wards where 
students typically do not live (Liverpool City Council, 2017b). Tellingly, perhaps, 
Central ward has a fivefold proportion in this age bracket compared to the city average. 
On the other hand, the student population in L17 has fallen by around two thirds 
(Liverpool Mayoral Review, 2015; authors’ interview). The 2016 ward population 
estimate for St Michael’s indicates that this former student area now has a population 
age profile similar to most of the rest of the wards in the city. 
In summary Liverpool has experienced some major changes in its pattern of student 
settlement. The focus of student living has dramatically shifted to the city centre. What 
needs to be explained is why. This is the task of the next section.  
 
Explaining the PBSA-based studentification of central Liverpool 
Our research suggests the boom in PBSA in central Liverpool has been generated by 
a number of mutually-supportive general and local factors. Significant investment in 
PBSA is not unique to Liverpool meaning some broader influences must be at work at 
the national level. These include, first, the growing maturity of a number of established 
providers in the market with proven investment and PBSA-management models. For 
example, Unite Students, an initiator of the sector in the early 1990s, presently houses 
some 50,000 students in England and Scotland (Unite Students, 2018). The Unite 
Group has been listed on the London Stock Exchange since 2000 and, at the time of 
writing, has a market capitalization of £1.92bn. Other examples of established PBSA 
providers include: UPP and Liberty Living with 31,500 and 27,000 beds respectively 
(Savills, 2017). 
A second driver of general UK PBSA is interest from international investors, with 
overseas real estate firms and pension funds particularly active (Cushman and 
Wakefield, 2017). Given the manner in which the residential property boom in many 
countries was punctured by the financial crisis, alternative investment opportunities 
that appear to offer a combination of resilient demand and high returns are clearly 
attractive. In 2016 the majority of activity in the market was generated by portfolio 
acquisitions of assets in which overseas actors were prevalent. Of the £3.1bn invested 
in student accommodation in that year sixty per cent came from outside the UK, with 
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notable interest from the US (£1bn), Singapore (£0.46bn) and the Middle East 
(£0.42bn) (Knight Frank, 2017). 
A final general influence underpinning the demand for PBSA in the UK is the changing 
form of student demand alongside the evolution of the student experience. What 
students want from their non-academic environment is undergoing a process of 
change. The HMO model, particularly where housing is remote from campus, may be 
undermined by the perception that it engenders isolation in comparison to new 
conveniently-located PBSA (Hubbard, 2009). 
Table 1 Student tenure types 2008-2016, per cent  
 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 
Privately let 38 38 38 34 26 
Family home 13 17 18 19 21 
PBSA 8 7 9 9 14 
University halls 21 24 22 18 21 
Source: Sodexo (2016) 
This said, it is important not to overstate the national shift in favour of PBSA. Table 1 
shows that since 2008 although the proportion of students in privately-provided 
accommodation (PBSA) has sharply increased from 8 to 14 per cent this as yet 
remains the smallest of student tenure types in the UK as a whole. 
Moving from the national level we identify two additional factors that underpin the 
provision of PBSA in Liverpool in particular. The first of these concerns the nature of 
the accommodation offers made by Liverpool’s universities and the strategies that 
underpin them. The universities’ perception is that, in a competitive environment where 
they choose not to compete on the price of tuition, the quality of accommodation is a 
major factor in students’ choice of university. One of Liverpool’s universities found it 
the third most important reason why applicants went to study elsewhere (authors’ 
interview). Interestingly, while all four local universities promote themselves using an 
accommodation tag and the three largest guarantee a bed to all first-year students, 
only Liverpool and Liverpool Hope universities own and operate halls of residence. 
Liverpool John Moores has no accommodation of its own. 
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Liverpool John Moores divested itself of a relatively small and disparate set of halls in 
the early 2000s and has since managed its accommodation offer through a tendering 
and partnership process with a score or so of private-sector partners. The market has 
been healthy enough to provide an adequate stream of good quality and well managed 
bed spaces. This means that Liverpool John Moores first years (level 4) constitute a 
large and stable pool of demand for private-sector providers. Importantly, though, 
accommodation offers from Liverpool John Moores and its partners are wholly PBSA-
based and located in central Liverpool. In other words, the university has itself been 
an agent in reshaping the market for the city’s student accommodation. Moreover, the 
process is self-reinforcing given that experience of conveniently located, good quality 
and competitively priced PBSA at level 4 tends to retain many Liverpool John Moores 
students in this type of tenure at levels 5 and 6 (authors’ interview). 
As the other big higher education institution in the city, Liverpool University’s 
accommodation strategy is also of interest. In an ambitious programme, which itself 
indicates something of the importance of accommodation offer in the recruitment 
process, the university has raised, from commercial sources, £260m to invest in 
building several brand new and imposing halls at its central campus and renovating 
existing stock ‘back-to-brick’. As it now offers PBSA in central Liverpool where it had 
relatively few beds before, the university is also driving forward the physical and social 
restructuring of the city. This is periodically compounded when recruitment exceeds 
the capacity of its accommodation portfolio. For example, in 2017-18 it secured several 
hundred extra beds from private PBSA providers for that academic year’s entry. 
Insofar as Liverpool’s two largest universities are agents in the process of the 
studentification of the city centre it might be argued that they, like private PBSA 
providers, are reshaping the city simply in response to changing perceptions about the 
student experience: that students themselves want it delivered in this form. But 
Liverpool’s universities have responded to students’ accommodation needs in one 
other significant and long-established way, presenting at least an alternative to the 
PBSA solution, albeit one students now seem to be questioning. Liverpool Student 
Homes (LSH) is an accommodation service collectively owned and managed on a not-
for-profit basis by the city’s four universities. It allows private landlords to advertise 
student properties subject to quality standards. The intention is “to protect students 
12 
 
from poor housing conditions and raise the quality of student accommodation across 
Liverpool” (Liverpool Student Homes, 2018). 
Traditionally, LSH’s ‘market’ has been HMO accommodation in Liverpool L7, L15 and 
L17 but this has become more concentrated as students have left L17 and there is, in 
LSH’s view now an oversupply in HMOs in L7 and L15. HMOs have also become more 
concentrated in the hands of fewer management companies and there is some degree 
of turbulence with small numbers of providers leaving and entering the market on a 
weekly basis. A simple interrogation of the LSH properties available page gives a 
flavour of the HMO market and, indeed, the surge in PBSA in central Liverpool. At the 
time of writing the total number of beds advertised in HMO-sized accommodation (up 
to 9 beds per property) was 3,931, compared to the total number of beds in PBSA-
sized property (which we have taken at a conservative >99 beds) which was 14,326. 
So even a university service which was ostensibly established to improve HMO 
standards for the city’s students has begun to reflect the major shifts in students’ living 
choices in favour of PBSA in central Liverpool. 
If Liverpool’s big universities are one set of agents of change in student 
accommodation, the other obvious set is comprised of PBSA providers. As noted, 
some of these are long-established firms with interests across multiple UK cities. 
However, there is a second category of local provider prominent in Liverpool adding 
an unusual degree of dynamism and, indeed, risk to the market. The large established 
providers are able to generate funding for expansion from their own internal resources 
and the financial markets. For example, Unite has two £90m medium-term bond issues 
on its corporate CV. An alternative way to fund property development – including 
PBSA – is to use a so-called fractional investment model. This is attractive to 
speculative developers because it minimizes initial outlay and generates funds as part 
of the development process; the equivalent, when it works, of very low cost just-in-
time finance. 
The fractional model operates in the following way (authors’ interviews; Bagaeen, 
2007; Hulse et al, 2018; Lunn, 2014). A developer agrees a site purchase for a PBSA 
or residential flats project subject to planning permission. They pay a deposit of say 
10 per cent of the purchase price with a completion date in perhaps nine months. This 
provides a window in which planning permission can be secured at least on an outline 
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basis. It also permits the developer to begin to market the scheme to potential 
investors, some of whom may be local but who can be reached – using sales agents 
– in other parts of the UK and the rest of the world. Currently, for example, there is a 
glossy hoardings-surrounded site in central Liverpool whose developer invites 
investments of £60,000 per unit with an 8.5 per cent return guaranteed for 5 years. A 
stunningly attractive yield in an uncertain post-financial crisis world of very low interest 
rates. Investors typically pay between 25 and 50 per cent on exchange of contracts 
providing the developer with the working capital to engage contractors to complete the 
project.  
There are three evident risks with this model. First, will a nascent development actually 
be completed? There are three large PBSA projects in the city that are presently 
stalled and one of these failed entirely in early 2018. Failure means investors probably 
lose everything. Second, if a development is completed, how well built is it and how 
adequately will it be managed? If a project is late or poorly finished and looks likely to 
fail commercially the developer can abandon the special purpose vehicle in which the 
whole initiative is wrapped and simply walk away. Third, it is the investors who are left 
to try to unpick the project and they only have title to perhaps one ‘pod’, of which there 
are possibly hundreds in a development; what might be their exit strategy? (authors’ 
interview; Hulse et al, 2018). Of course, the fractional model can work successfully, 
but one of our interviewees suggested that the entire process is akin to ‘spinning 
plates’: everything has to work – with developer, planning permission, investors, 
contractors and students falling precisely into place at the right moment. In Liverpool, 
to pursue the analogy, one plate has smashed and others are wobbling. We suspect 
more will follow. 
 
The implications of the changing geography of Liverpool’s student population 
The first issue we address here is the potential de-studentification of Liverpool’s 
traditional areas of student living: L7, L15 and L17. Of these localities, only L17 has 
experienced the kind of population change that has refashioned its economic and 
social characteristics. De-studentification may sometimes be read as deleterious 
abandonment in the sense that students gradually desert an area to its cost. Kinton et 
al (2016) offer an original empirical analysis of this as a cumulative process in the 
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context of Loughborough in which empty beds lead to empty houses and empty 
houses ultimately to empty streets. What happens next in Loughborough is for now a 
question for further research but, regardless, it will be a matter of reviving a locality 
after demand has imploded. In L17 things have worked out rather differently; de-
studentification has not been synonymous with even temporary urban decay. What 
seems to have happened here is that, while the students have certainly left for either 
HMOs in L7 and L15, or PBSA in central Liverpool, the locality has been resettled by 
more affluent residents. There have never been empty streets and any empty houses 
sell on average at 37 per cent above the level for Liverpool as a whole. Most economic 
and social indicators suggest an appealing neighbourhood, for example, a lower 
unemployment rate and lower child poverty than the city-wide averages (Liverpool City 
Council, 2017b). This appears to be a case of de-studentification as gentrification. The 
precise drivers of the social and economic reorientation of L17 are unclear but our 
perception is that students were effectively out-competed by new residents – owner 
occupiers and ‘generation rent’ professionals – moving to an increasingly desirable 
area in a period when alternative or new student accommodation was readily available 
elsewhere. 
In L7 and L15 a nascent de-studentification is unfolding rather differently. These two 
areas now contain around 60 per cent of the city’s student HMOs compared to only 40 
per cent in 2000; but the number of HMOs has fallen across the city by a third over 
the same period. There is also a slackening of demand for student HMOs in L7 and 
L15 and therefore something of an excess supply (authors’ interviews). Overall then 
there are fewer but more geographically concentrated student HMOs in Liverpool. The 
falling numbers may be partly explained by shifting student preferences in favour of 
PBSA but it may also have been conditioned by new forms of non-student HMO 
demand from migrant workers, asylum seekers and people forced to change domicile 
because of the ‘bedroom tax’ (Liverpool Mayoral Review, 2015). 
One notable implication of the limited de-studentification of L7 and L15 that has so far 
occurred is its effect on the quality and price of HMO accommodation. In the 
competitive scramble to find and retain tenants, landlords have had to improve their 
offer. 
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“In the past landlords didn’t need to invest much in their properties but the market 
now demands that they do: most students get good accommodation and rents 
remain relatively low” (authors’ interview). 
This suggests that the market is already reacting to the threats posed by the PBSA 
explosion in the city centre and this may of itself put a drag on the de-studentification 
process in L7 and L15. 
Some stakeholders in the student HMO market in L7 and L15 have real concerns 
about the implications of the profusion of PBSA spaces in central Liverpool for their 
businesses and lives. For example, in evidence to the Liverpool Mayoral Review, a 
representative of Wavertree [L15] landlords accepted that, 
“We must compete with what is happening in the city centre…the major impact I 
fear [is] the oversupply of city centre student accommodation…on my business”, 
(Liverpool Mayoral Review, 2015, appendix 1, representation 12).  
Interestingly, the same individual offered a different perspective on the alternative 
merits of HMO and PBSA student living. 
“We believe we can provide a holistic experience for our students that could not 
be [had] by living on the 9th floor of a big development, in a one room “pod” 
where they eat, sleep, wash and study for most of their time and venture out 
only to pay £3.00 for three slices of boiled ham…With so much reporting in the 
media of the alarming deterioration in the mental health of today’s student 
population, no amount of luxury city centre living can compete with the…‘vibe’ 
around a local community which includes, encourages and facilitates the 
enrichment of student life, whilst students are learning to live as an independent 
adult in their own home” (Liverpool Mayoral Review, 2015, appendix 1, 
representation 12). 
The appeal to local community is something that resonates with other stakeholders. 
The Dales Residents Group (DRG) in its representation to the Liverpool Mayoral 
Review offered a thoughtful reflection on the tensions between studentification and de-
studentification. The DRG highlighted problems posed by large numbers of HMOs in a 
particular residential area of L15: generally the kind of negative externalities noted in 
the literature (see, for example, Sage et al, 2011). But while asking for a temporary 
stay on council licenses for landlords in this locality, the DRG’s conclusion was that, 
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“Despite the problems that we face, we are more interested in resolving them 
than we are in wanting to remove our existing student residents: we want 
students to have a positive experience of living in a community in our city. We 
are therefore unsure about the massive development of student housing in the 
city centre…We are also concerned about the effect that development in the 
centre will have on our local businesses…we know that many…depend on the 
student market and we would be very unhappy to see Smithdown Road have 
any more empty shop premises.” (Liverpool Mayoral Review, 2015, appendix 1, 
representation 7). 
Note that these sentiments chime with some of the noted positive aspects of 
studentification (Hubbard, 2008; Kenyon, 1997; Ruiu, 2017; Smith, 2008). 
There are worries then that L7 and L15 may be areas on the cusp of de-studentification. 
The position on this matter taken by another major stakeholder, Liverpool City Council, 
is not yet fully developed. The Draft Liverpool Local Plan 2016 (Liverpool City Council, 
2016), due to be formally adopted by the beginning of 2019, makes explicit reference 
to Liverpool’s student housing provision but, perhaps unsurprisingly, the principal 
policy focus is on PBSA. We return to this below. What activity there is by the council 
in the traditional student HMO areas is associated with HMO licensing under the 2004 
Housing Act, the use of the planning process to regulating HMO creation, or driven in 
part by the agency of local councillors (authors’ interview). For example, in 2015 the 
city council announced a moratorium on ‘To Let’ and ‘Let Agreed’ signage in L15 which 
was warmly welcomed by local residents in its impact on the appearance of the area 
(Liverpool Mayoral Review, 2015, appendix 1, representation 7). 
The future direction of travel for L7 and L15 appears for the moment to be uncertain. 
These are still firmly-established student areas with multiple HMOs in concentrations 
that do not appear in any other part of Liverpool (Liverpool City Council, 2017c). But to 
some extent both localities may prove vulnerable to the de-studentification process 
outlined by Kinton et al (2016). Much will probably turn on the contingencies generated 
by the boom in PBSA in central Liverpool. This is the focus of the next section. 
 
 
Issues around the PBSA studentification of central Liverpool 
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For local residents, the studentification of particular parts of Liverpool’s city centre has 
thrown up a mixture of familiar problems, tempered by the positive spin offs of a thriving 
population. For example, in the Marybone area of L3 where there is a particular 
concentration of PBSA serving Liverpool John Moores’ students, local residents have 
experienced problems with noise at night, anti-social behaviour, refuse disposal and 
end-of-tenancy fly-tipping. More positively, the presence of several thousand students 
has encouraged new shops and GP surgeries to open, and life has been breathed into 
what was an area on the economic and social margins (Liverpool Mayoral Review, 
2015, appendix 1, representation 1; authors’ interview). The general perception, 
however, is that Marybone has become over-studentified, with an estimated 1,000 
local residents sharing a relatively small space with up to 3,000 students (Liverpool 
City Council, 2016). None of our interviewees dissented from this view. The Mayoral 
Review into The Future of Student Accommodation in Liverpool appeared to accept 
that for certain locales, the pressures associated with PBSA have become too intense. 
One of the Review’s recommendations was that,  
“The Council should introduce zones of opportunity to encourage/direct purpose 
built development into the most suitable areas of the City Centre. At the same 
time the local planning authority should seek to use its powers to discourage 
development in less appropriate areas of the City Centre” (Liverpool Mayoral 
Review, 2015, p1). 
The Review had two issues in mind in making this recommendation. First, it addresses 
overstudentification. Presumably, no further unbalanced communities such as 
Marybone will be permitted to develop. Second, the Review was mindful of the potential 
impact on the wider potential of the city’s economy, 
“Student accommodation is competing with other high value commercial 
interests and care needs to be exercised in ensuring City Centre sites utilized 
for student accommodation do not impact on the overall commercial potential of 
the City Centre.” (Liverpool Mayoral Review, 2015, p18). 
We noted earlier that the PBSA-based redevelopment of Lime Street was strongly 
opposed by heritage interests. The tension between PBSA developments and other 
stakeholders is also evident elsewhere in central Liverpool. For example, in the Baltic 
Triangle, a warehousing and industrial area that was mostly derelict fifteen years ago, 
there has been a wave of investment in the creative and digital sectors, alongside 
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residential and leisure-based developments. It is an exciting place, beginning to thrive. 
Would PBSA complement the Baltic Triangle? Not according to those in the creative 
community: 
“The Baltic creative is certainly the wrong location for PBSA and if developments 
continue it will stall and reverse the enterprise and job creation potential of the 
area.” (Liverpool Mayoral Review, 2015, appendix 1, representation 15). 
This perception is based on the perceived generation of a “slum like feel” by an earlier 
round of PBSA in the Baltic Triangle, deadening to enterprise. 
Other objections include the potential for PBSA to undermine the aesthetics of an area 
that still retains a number of notable nineteenth century buildings that are slowly being 
brought back into use. One of the city’s large presently half-built and seemingly 
abandoned PBSA projects stands – a bare concrete frame – in stark contrast to an 
imposing old brick warehouse that is about to be refurbished on the same street. 
There are parts of the city centre fringe that are much less contested than the Baltic 
Triangle. Here, rather than being seen as generators of social problems, or 
impediments to regeneration of a particular form, students and studentification have 
become one of the drivers of urban renewal. For example, just beyond the more 
northerly of Liverpool John Moores’ two principal campuses, there is an expanse of 
land mostly underdeveloped for decades and blighted by the dominating traffic-access 
routes to the Wallasey Tunnel. Parts of this area have already been used for 
substantial PBSA development and there are further projects underway. But how 
successful these will prove to be remains an open question. There are already signs 
of under-occupation of existing PBSA at this location that may be explained by its 
remoteness from the heart of the city (authors’ interview). Will additional developments 
that are even more remote prove attractive? One local politician has predicted that 
plans for the area, “will be really transformative, or a disaster” (authors’ interview). The 
outcome will partly turn on whether there are enough new students to match the 
burgeoning supply of PBSA in Liverpool and whether many of them see this particular 
area as a place where they want to live. 
Having reviewed some issues around the studentification of central Liverpool we now 
consider the vital question of its sustainability. 
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Table 2 Student accommodation by type in Liverpool, selected years 
Year HMO Halls PBSA Total 
2015 8000 6300 14000 28300 
2018 7089 6300 18000 31389 
2020 6000 6300 27000 39300 
Source: Liverpool City Council, City Residential, own estimates 
Table 2 shows numbers of beds across three tenure types for the city as a whole. The 
data for 2015 were drawn from the Mayoral Review (2015). The HMO figure for 2018 
was calculated from Liverpool City Council’s publicly available HMO register. We have 
extrapolated an estimate for HMO beds for 2020. The halls figures are the combined 
totals for Liverpool University and Hope University. The PBSA data are drawn from the 
Mayoral Review, updated for completions and projects with planning permission 
collated by City Residential (2018). 
Two things stand out from Table 2. First, the increase in student accommodation in 
Liverpool is driven entirely by PBSA. Should all accommodation in the pipeline be built 
out, Liverpool’s private PBSA offer will have broadly doubled over about five years. 
Second the total supply of beds in the city – at almost 40,000 – will be some way in 
excess of actual needs. With the local student population relatively stable, demand for 
beds is estimated at 34,000 (Liverpool Mayoral Review, 2015). The Mayoral Review 
concluded that, 
“there is no evidence to support the introduction of a moratorium on new student 
accommodation schemes in the City” (p1). 
This position appears now to be harder to maintain. It is possible that not all 
accommodation in the pipeline will be realized. The city council is sanguine on this 
point, 
 “based upon previous experience, the view of Liverpool City Council’s Planning 
Department is that there will almost certainly be a number of schemes which 
simply will not progress either because of lack of finance, failure to achieve 
planning permission or a change in the developer’s own aspirations for the site” 
(Liverpool Mayoral Review, 2015 p9). 
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The Review also suggests that the market itself may apply a natural brake to the 
process as ‘saturation point approaches’. This is an interesting view made more so by 
the presence of different kinds of provider in Liverpool. The large, experienced firms 
that build, own and manage PBSA may well pause their interest in the city once their 
current projects are completed. But these are not in the majority. Of the twenty three 
PBSA projects in the pipeline at the time of writing seventeen have either unclear 
sources of funding or are based on the fractional model described earlier and, of these, 
twelve appear to be wholly fractionally funded. 
The inherent problem with fractional funding lies in the potentially disparate interests 
of its principal parties. The developer’s priority is to successfully launch and sell a 
project. Once investors are in place the risk to the developer is minimal: costs incurred 
so far will have probably been covered and it is possible to simply abandon a scheme 
with too many emergent flaws – with contractors or lack of student demand, for 
example. For investors, risk appears weighted downstream towards issues of build 
quality, completion and occupation. Problems with any of these may give rise to partial 
or complete losses as their asset declines in value and they have no obvious exit 
strategy: to whom might they sell their share of a failed project and at what price? This 
begs questions about investors’ perceptions of risk. In the fractional model these are 
masked by the very high guaranteed yields noted earlier. Such returns are 
underpinned by including provision for yields in the purchase price of each unit which 
are quoted at up to twice the rate per square foot of the average for Liverpool (Liverpool 
Mayoral Review, 2015, appendix 1, representation 11). Small investors in other parts 
of the country or abroad may not be best placed to perform the due diligence that would 
uncover this kind of detail. Using concepts from economics, investors have an 
asymmetric information problem for which there are few immediately available 
counteracting institutions. 
In the fractional model risks appear to be disproportionately borne by investors. There 
have been several instances in Liverpool where fractionally-financed projects have 
been stalled, failed or become otherwise problematic as the interests of developer and 
investors have diverged. In such cases investors have sometimes not seen a penny of 
the promised yields on units purchased for £50,000 plus (authors’ interview). Just as 
importantly, when things go badly wrong, the city and local residents also bear losses 
in the form of the blight of abandoned projects. Unfortunately, the failed skeletal seven-
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level 240 unit ‘Quadrant’ development on Shaw Street stands in the immediate vicinity 
of a mixed residential area and the city campus of Liverpool Hope University. 
In the context of the present state of Liverpool’s PBSA market, it might not be 
unreasonable to characterize the fractional funding model as a coming generator of 
failure and blight. Our argument is that the city is now at the point of PBSA saturation 
(see also Hearn, 2016; Savills, 2017), with the pipeline supply of beds as likely as not 
to tip the fractional market into meltdown as investors take fright and projects are 
abandoned. Importantly though, the fractional model remains viable until investors 
absent themselves entirely from the market. So long as new sources of investment can 
be tapped, developers, bearing relatively little risk, have an incentive to bring new 
projects on stream. There are echoes here of the property boom that preceded the 
2008 financial crisis in the sense that market facilitators selling highly questionable 
mortgages were exposed to much less risk than the home buyers with whom they were 
dealing. The boom was sustained by this uneven risk and by the asymmetric 
information problem facing buyers and other investors. 
This sombre reading of the market may be compounded by policy changes in higher 
education. To some extent the boom in PBSA is a reflection of the rapid recent 
expansion of universities. But there are signs that this may come to an end. Both the 
UK’s major political parties are contemplating changes to university funding (for 
example, a year-long government review of post-18 education, including how it is 
financed, was launched in February 2018). There are, as yet, few details but the 
possibilities include reduced tuition fees and the restoration of a direct grant system. It 
may be that more active recruitment of foreign students could offset reductions in 
domestic fee income. One in five UK students is now from abroad with China the 
biggest single source of recruitment and one that is presently growing significantly 
(UKCSIA, 2017). However, should their incomes come under pressure for the first time 
in two decades, it is probable that universities would become more conservative in their 
plans than hitherto and that student numbers would fall. There have been suggestions 
that even marginally reduced university incomes could push some institutions towards 
insolvency (Adams and Hall, 2018). A sudden check to the student population would 
be very likely to shock the fractional model element of the PBSA boom in Liverpool into 
collapse were it to prompt investors to leave the market. 
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Conclusions 
Our argument that the PBSA market in Liverpool is saturated and that the fractional 
funding model in particular is likely to generate more failed projects before it, at some 
stage, implodes, gives rise to three sets of issues. First, what are the implications of 
this scenario for the different groups with a stake in the market; second, what might be 
learned in policy terms from Liverpool’s PBSA boom; and third how should the boom 
be contextualized in post-industrial Liverpool? 
The major PBSA stakeholders include: Liverpool’s student accommodation providers, 
the universities and their students; other residents and businesses in the city and the 
city council. The impact of a crash on accommodation providers will be conditioned by 
their particular role in the market. Developers engaged in projects with fractional 
financing will be largely unable to continue as the model’s shortcomings become more 
widely shared among investors. There are already signs that this is happening with, for 
example, warnings from local politicians about Ponzi schemes in the city and adverse 
publicity in some key overseas markets (see Cook, 2017; Kemp, 2018). Established 
PBSA providers and managers may be expected to mostly ride out any market shock 
though there may be a risk that some students could become disaffected with city 
centre living were this to become a contaminated brand locally. There is also the 
unknown impact of any future shifts in higher education funding and student 
recruitment. For HMO providers any reversal in the spread of PBSA in central Liverpool 
is likely to prove positive. Two traditional student areas are still firmly embedded in the 
city; their nascent destudentification may be arrested by the demise of a group of direct 
competitors. 
The city’s universities will almost certainly be more concerned with changes to higher 
education policy than with events in the PBSA market. Though accommodation is an 
important factor in recruitment, the bigger universities – Liverpool and John Moores – 
both have strategies presently in place that cater for anticipated demand over the 
medium term. An end to the PBSA boom will not interfere with these strategies and 
students will not find themselves without a wide choice of good-quality accommodation. 
The more pronounced negative spillover effects of a PBSA shock centred on the 
plethora of fractionally funded projects in the city will probably be felt by Liverpool’s 
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residents and businesses. The obvious direct impact is the neighbourhood dereliction 
and decay. We have already noted the failed and stalled PBSA projects on Shaw Street 
and in the Baltic Triangle. There is a further stalled PBSA initiative on the north side of 
Liverpool’s principal train station, as well as the failed (non-student) Chinatown site 
that dominates a southern approach to the city centre. How these will eventually be 
cleaned up and who pays are open questions. In the meantime, already measured in 
years, they cast derelict shadows on those around them. The Chinatown site has been 
the subject of complaints over litter and rats from nearby residents (Houghton, 2018).   
The public policy lessons of Liverpool’s experience of a burgeoning PBSA market must 
at least in part turn on whether or not our gloomy prognosis comes to pass. When 
demand for a particular use for a building evaporates an obvious question is: what 
alternatives might there be? In its Draft Local Plan, the city council makes explicit 
reference to the need for buildings that can be adapted to changing market conditions, 
“Proposals should incorporate future-proofing arrangements to ensure [PBSA] 
is able to respond to changing market conditions, by embedding flexibility of use 
within the design to enable the building to readily accommodate a viable 
alternative use” (Liverpool City Council, 2016). 
Such a policy is laudable but none of our interviewees were aware of it yet being 
actioned; it may also be to some extent redundant. If there is a disorderly end to 
Liverpool’s PBSA boom the legacy will not be a tidy set of finished buildings ripe for 
alternative use but some finished projects and a collection of unfinished structures and 
abandoned sites. 
The bigger question is how to engineer a softer landing for the city. There is limited 
room for manoeuver in already troubled PBSA and other fractional projects. It would 
be better not to start from here. That said, the way forward almost certainly lies with 
the city council in the excise of its powers of planning control and, in particular, in its 
partnering decisions about developers and development models. Projects with esoteric 
financing can succeed. There are a number in Liverpool that have achieved 
uncontroversial completion. The problem is that not all of them succeed and, in the 
context of PBSA, with a saturated market and looming review into higher education, it 
is entirely possible that many will fail. Future decisions need to be more informed about 
the market they are feeding. The city council can better seed the prospects for 
24 
 
Liverpool’s physical, social and economic future by partnering with proven developers 
employing conventional funding models. That is the best way forward: to leaven a risk-
laden market with projects that can be depended upon. 
More generally, a disorderly end to the PBSA boom would raise wider questions about 
reputational damage to the city. Liverpool’s economy, its physical fabric and its 
aspirations have all changed markedly since the millennium with the completion of a 
large number of flagship projects and events and the continuing integration and 
extension of waterfront developments north and south of the city centre. Private 
investment in this continuing work is underpinned by confidence in the city’s polity and 
economy (Parkinson et al, 2016). In the context of uncertainties regarding the interplay 
between Brexit, austerity and the emergent City Region and other policy and political 
frameworks (Nurse, 2017), what the city does not need is to be suddenly pockmarked 
with unfinished projects and empty sites enclosed by ragged hoardings. In such 
circumstances the city might find its renaissance more difficult to consolidate. 
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